Currently released so far... 1947 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/28
2010/12/27
2010/12/26
2010/12/25
2010/12/24
2010/12/23
2010/12/22
2010/12/21
2010/12/20
2010/12/19
2010/12/18
2010/12/17
2010/12/16
2010/12/15
2010/12/14
2010/12/13
2010/12/12
2010/12/11
2010/12/10
2010/12/09
2010/12/08
2010/12/07
2010/12/06
2010/12/05
2010/12/04
2010/12/03
2010/12/02
2010/12/01
2010/11/30
2010/11/29
2010/11/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Paris
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Browse by tag
CU
CO
CH
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CI
CS
CVIS
CA
CBW
CASC
CD
CV
CMGT
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
COUNTERTERRORISM
COUNTER
EG
EFIN
EZ
ETRD
ETTC
ECON
EUN
ELAB
EU
EINV
EAID
EMIN
ENRG
ECPS
EN
ER
ET
ES
EPET
EUC
EI
EAIR
EAGR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ENVR
EINVETC
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
EXTERNAL
ECIP
EINDETRD
IV
IR
IS
IZ
IAEA
IN
IT
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
INRB
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
ID
ITPHUM
IO
IRAQI
ITALY
ITALIAN
IMO
KNNP
KWBG
KU
KPAL
KGHG
KPAO
KAWK
KISL
KHLS
KSUM
KSPR
KDEM
KJUS
KCRM
KGCC
KPIN
KDRG
KTFN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KN
KS
KCOR
KZ
KE
KFRD
KTIP
KIPR
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KGIC
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KDEV
KWMN
KTIA
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KPKO
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KNPP
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
MOPS
MARR
MNUC
MX
MASS
MCAP
MO
MIL
MTCRE
ML
MR
MZ
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MPOS
MAR
MD
MEPP
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PINS
PREF
PK
PE
PBTS
POGOV
PARM
PROP
PINL
PL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
PAK
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 10NAIROBI181, Chinese Engagement in Kenya
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10NAIROBI181.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10NAIROBI181 | 2010-02-17 07:07 | 2010-12-08 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Nairobi |
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHNR #0181/01 0480701
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 170701Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0874
INFO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
Wednesday, 17 February 2010, 07:01
S E C R E T NAIROBI 000181
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/17
TAGS PREL, EAID, KE, XW, ECON, EINV, ENRG, EFIN, PGOV, CH, PINR
SUBJECT: Chinese Engagement in Kenya
REF: 10 STATE 10152
CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Walton, Economics Officer, State, Econ; REASON: 1.4(B), (C), (D)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: China’s engagement in Kenya continues to grow exponentially. China enjoys a large trade surplus with Kenya; exports increased by more than 25 percent a year from 2004 to 2008. The China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) is drilling for oil in the Isiolo region. China may be a potential partner in the development of the new mega-port at Lamu. In addition, China is heavily involved in various infrastructure projects across Kenya primarily with roads. China is also providing weapons to the GOK in support of its Somalia policies and increasing their involvement with the Kenyan National Security and Intelligence Service (NSIS) by providing telecommunications and computer equipment. Recently, China signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with the GOK providing new development grants. To date, China and the U.S. do not collaborate on development projects in Kenya. End summary.
¶2. (U) China enjoys a large trade surplus with Kenya, exporting more than 30 times its imports. For 2008, China exported $917 million of goods to Kenya while China imported $29 million worth of Kenyan goods. China’s exports in 2008 grew by 39 percent over 2007 capping the fourth straight year of at least 25 percent export growth, including a 54 percent increase in 2007 and a 79 percent increase in 2005. China is now the third largest exporter to Kenya after the United Arab Emirates, which principally exports oil to Kenya, and India. In comparison, the U.S. exported $440 million worth of goods to Kenya in 2008 while importing $343 million worth of Kenyan goods.
¶3. (U) The CNOOC is drilling for oil in the Isiolo region of Kenya (see ref A). The exploratory well will cost $26 million dollars and drilling will be complete in April 2010. Numerous oil companies have drilled 31 exploratory wells in Kenya over the last 50 years without success. However, CNOOC is making a credible effort to find oil in an area geologically similar to Southern Sudan, with its substantial oil finds. As reported ref A, we had heard that CNOOC would announce results from the exploratory well by January 2010; we are now hearing an announcement may come in April.
¶4. (U) The GOK is highly interested in developing a major port complex in Lamu, which has much greater potential as a deep water port than Mombasa. The GOK originally held discussions with Qatar over the development of the Lamu port in return for a substantial allocation of farm land. Negotiations involving development of the Lamu port reportedly occur inside the “black box” of President Kibaki’s inner circle at State House. We understand, however, that talks with Qatar are off, and that the Chinese are in play as a potential partner for the port development project and associated regional infrastructure (road and rail infrastructure to Southern Sudan and Ethiopia, and pipeline infrastructure to Southern Sudan and Uganda). China’s interest in the Lamu project is reportedly linked to the presence of oil in Southern Sudan and Uganda which could be exported via Lamu as well as the greater export potential to Ethiopia, Southern Sudan and Uganda. The addition of oil from Isiolo would add additional impetus to China’s interest in the port development which is estimated to cost more than $5 billion.
¶5. (SBU) China is currently developing a number of infrastructure projects in Kenya. Currently, China Wuyi, Syno Hydro, and China Overseas Engineering Corporation are working on the Thika Road project, a major eight lane highway from Nairobi to Thika town. Another Chinese firm, Shengli Engineering & Consulting Company was the prime contractor for the Mombasa-City Centre-Gigiri road upgrade project. In addition, the second phase of a project to upgrade the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) is being worked by China National Aero-Technology International Engineering Company (CATIC). The first phase of the project was completed by the Chinese company, China Wu Yi. TBEA International, another Chinese firm, is developing a 120 MW thermal plant in Longonot and 600 MW coal-fired power station in Mombasa as an independent power producer. TBEA is also undertaking projects that involve construction of 132 kV lines and sub-stations in the Rift Valley, Central, Western and Coast provinces. During a recent visit to the Olkaria geothermal development site in the Rift Valley Province, Econoff observed that Great Wall Drilling, another Chinese company, was exploring for geothermal energy. The KenGen Olkaria Geothermal Development Manager told Econoff that while he would prefer to buy quality American drills, pipes, and other geothermal-related products, American companies could not compete with China on price and price won every time in Kenya.
¶6. (S/NF) In January 2010, the GOK received from the GOC via CATIC weapons, ammunition, supplies, and textiles for making uniforms in support of the GOK’s Jubaland initiative.
¶7. (S/NF) As of late August 2009, XXXXXXXXXXXX awarded XXXXXXXXXXXX a contract to provide landline telephone monitoring equipment to XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX awarded the contract to XXXXXXXXXXXX after being pressured to do so by XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX . XXXXXXXXXXXX ’s preference for is based on kickbacks he received XXXXXXXXXXXX while on a visit to China. XXXXXXXXXXXX received monthly payments of over $5000 from XXXXXXXXXXXX which were used to pay medical bills.
¶8. (S/NF) As of September 2008, XXXXXXXXXXXX As of early March 2009, Chinese technicians were working on a project in the basement of the NSIS headquarters. The presence of the technicians was well known throughout the NSIS and was causing some concern over the level of cooperation between the NSIS and its Chinese counterparts.
¶9. (U) The GOK and GOC recently signed an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement. The agreement provides a $7.3 million grant from China to Kenya. Of the grant, $150,000 will finance a computer program for the Ministry of Finance while the remaining funds can be used by the GOK to fund development projects of their choice. The agreement also covered Chinese funding of feasibility studies for the potential development of Lamu port. In addition, China committed to funding portions of the Northern Corridor road project, which links Mombasa and Nairobi to Ethiopia and Southern Sudan, as well as parts of the new Mombasa-Kampala standard gauge railway. Currently, China’s Shengli Engineering Construction is refurbishing The Moi International Sports Complex at Kasarani with $12.8 million of grant-in-aid money from China. In Early 2009, China provided a $1 million grant to the GOK for the construction of a 100 bed hospital in Nairobi. In 2008, the GOK received approximately $381 million in interest-free and preferential loans, with $145 million intended for the planned ring roads aimed at decongesting Nairobi. Since 2008, the GOK has implemented campaigns to attract investment from the $1 billion China-Africa Development Fund.
¶10. (U) China’s companies working in Kenya tend to import a substantial number of Chinese workers. This importation of labor from China tends to limit the number of Kenyans who directly benefit with wages and knowledge transfer from the projects. The low Chinese bids on major projects also push local firms out of the process, especially in infrastructure areas where capacity building of local firms would be useful. In addition, the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) noticed a marked increase in poaching wherever Chinese labor camps were located and in fact set up specific interdiction efforts aimed to reduce poaching (see ref B). KWS also reports that 90% of the ivory smugglers detained at JKIA are Chinese nationals.
¶11. (U) The U.S. mission in Kenya has no current or pending development partnership arrangements with the GOC or any informal collaboration at the program or project level. The GOC does not participate in donor coordination in Kenya. Donors have encouraged the GOK to bring China into the donor coordination process, but no progress has been made to date. While we do not recommend it, a potential area for collaboration could include agricultural development, a USG strength and an area of Chinese interest in Africa. However, the GOC does not participate in the multilateral agricultural donors group in Kenya. The GOC could be invited to join this donors group, predicated on their willingness to sign a Memorandum of Understanding ensuring their support of Kenya’s long term agriculture strategy. The World Bank recently announced a new initiative to work in cooperation with Chinese infrastructure development in Africa. This new effort seems to be aimed at working with China and African countries to maximize the benefits of Chinese development aid to the African people.
¶12. (SBU) Comment: Collaboration between the USG and China in Kenya should be approached cautiously as there appears to be little dovetailing of our interests to date. The GOC has been silent on the implementation of the reform agenda, which we consider essential to Kenya’s future stability and prosperity; the GOC turns a blind eye to the flooding of the Kenyan market with Chinese counterfeit goods, such as batteries, which directly damage U.S. market share here; and the GOC has not demonstrated any commitment to curb ivory poaching. We expect China’s engagement in Kenya to continue to grow given Kenya’s strategic location. If oil or gas is found in Kenya, this engagement will likely grow even faster. Kenya’s leadership may be tempted to move ever closer to China in an effort to shield itself from Western, and principally U.S., pressure to reform. Given the possibility of a backlash by the Kenyan people against China, perhaps over the issue of imported Chinese labor or mishandling of natural resources, there may be benefits to keeping our distance, at least publicly, from China. RANNEBERGER