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Viewing cable 09BAMAKO776, AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL WARD MEET WITH MALIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAMAKO776 2009-12-01 16:04 2010-12-14 21:09 SECRET Embassy Bamako
VZCZCXRO4337
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0776/01 3351639
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011639Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0930
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0698
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 0341
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 0296
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0526
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000776 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019 
TAGS: ASEC ML PGOV PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL WARD MEET WITH MALIAN 
PRESIDENT AMADOU TOUMANI TOURE 

REF: A. A. BAMAKO 754 
B. B. 2008 BAMAKO 217 

Classified By: Ambassador Gillian Milovanovic, Embassy Bamako, for reas 
ons 1.4 (b) (d). 

SUMMARY 

1. (S) On November 27 the Ambassador and Commander of the 
U.S. Africa Command, General William E. ("Kip") Ward, met 
with Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) to discuss 
security in Northern Mali. ATT reiterated his commitment to 
take action against Al Q'Aida in the Lands of the Islamic 
Maghreb, now possibly in January. General Ward encouraged 
the President to follow through with convening the Bamako 
Summit. ATT indicated he plans to travel to Algiers to meet 
with Algerian President Bouteflika to set the date , 
demonstrate his commitment and gain his support. ATT and 
General Ward agreed that, with or without regional 
cooperation, Mali has no choice but to move forward in 
confronting terrorist and criminal elements in the North. 

THANKS FOR SUPPORT WITH HARD LANDING 

2. (S) On November 27 the Ambassador and U.S. Africa 
Command General William E. ("Kip") Ward met with Malian 
President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT). The Ambassador and 
General Ward were accompanied by Foreign Policy Advisor Dr. 
Raymond L. Brown and AFRICOM Public Affairs Director Colonel 
Frank Childress. ATT was accompanied by Minister of Defense 
Natie Pleah, Secretary General to the PresidencyDiango 
Cissoko, and Chief of Defense Poudiougou. General Ward 
thanked the President for Mali's support in the recent hard 
landing of a plane carrying U.S. military personnel 
approximately 65 miles outside of Bamako. ATT reiterated ref 
A comments that it was only natural Mali should help, since 
after all he knew the United States was coming to help Mali. 

PROGRESS AND CONCERNS IN NORTHERN MALI 
3. (S) ATT said that since General Ward's last visit (ref 
B) the Tuareg rebellion had been brought to an end. Even the 
head of the most recent rebellion has sent a message of 
peace, and ten or so of the former rebels, "since they like 
to fight so much" are being sent off to support the African 
Union Mission in Somalia (see IIR 6 958 0021 10). ATT said 
he had concerns about the Salafists, another term for Al 
Q'Aida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). While the 
Salafists have had difficulty getting their message across to 
a generally reluctant population, they have had some success 
in enlisting disaffected youth to their ranks. He said the 
Malian Army is at a turning point, with the older generation 
in the military giving way to a younger, less experienced 
one. In this regard, he thanked General Ward for the 
training the United States is providing to the recently 
created Echelons Tactiques Inter-Arme (ETIAs). 

NEED FOR MORE REGIONAL COOPERATION 

4. (S) ATT lamented that regional cooperation appears to 
be stalled. Mauritanian President Aziz is a soldier who 
understands the situation. He has put the recent political 
troubles behind him and is working well with Mali. Niger has 
always been a good partner. Although the country has its own 
Tuareg rebellion problem and is focused on a domestic 
political crisis, Niger continues to work well together with 
Mali. Military cooperation with Algeria is the problem. ATT 
said the Algerians think we do not do anything, and they are 
not totally wrong, but we need Algeria's help in terms of air 
support. It is not just a matter of destroying a couple of 
AQIM bases, we have to be able to hold the territory. The 
longer the situation drags on, the stronger the Salafists 
will get. 

5. (S) ATT directly linked revenues from drug trafficking 
to terrorism. He said the Boeing 727 which had been set fire 
near Tarkint, in Northern Mali after it got stuck in the sand 
on or about October 30 may have been carrying drugs. Mali 
is cooperating with friendly countries to try to gain 
information about the nature of the flight and has lodged 
complaints about the violation of its air space with Interpol 
and with the UN Office of Drugs and Crime. ATT said security 
will be easier to achieve with three or four countries 

BAMAKO 00000776 002 OF 003 


working together rather than alone. If the other countries 
cannot agree, then of course we have to do it ourselves, he 
said. 

UNITED STATES COMMITTED TO HELP 

6. (S) General Ward thanked the President for catching him 
up on the situation. He said he is happy to hear of the 
President's continued commitment to fighting terrorism. If 
the government of Mali is unable to gain better control over 
under-governed territory, it will continue to give free reign 
to arms and drug traffickers and terrorists, frustrating 
legitimate development efforts. General Ward said that, with 
Ambassador Milovanovic, we are paying close attention to how 
we can increase the capacity of the Malian Army to eliminate 
the threat posed. The United States is looking to ensure a 
continuum of training and maintenance capacity building. 
Keeping trained units together and using the equipment 
provided in a sustainable manner will help Mali achieve its 
goals. 

7. (S) General Ward said he shares ATT's analysis that the 
bad guys do not respect borders and that Mali needs regional 
cooperation. Having just come from Algeria, General Ward 
said he had made the same point to Algerian President 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, as well as to the Algerian Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and Defense, and to the Chief of Defense: 
all agreed to the need for regional cooperation. General 
Ward said he would be looking for signs of increased 
cooperation on the ground. 

8. (S) The USG supports the implementation and follow-on 
to the meeting of Chiefs of Defense in Tamanrassett, Algeria 
as well as the heads of state meeting in Bamako. General 
Ward said he hopes the joint operations center discussed in 
Tamanrassett will become a reality soon, and will be able to 
support operations in the North of Mali. Once the operations 
center becomes a reality, the USG stands ready to assist with 
training and equipment if asked, as well as providing 
transparent updates on U.S. security engagement with regional 
partners. General Ward said he was very impressed by ATT's 
statement that, whether or not the neighbors get involved in 
a constructive manner, he would be taking responsibility for 
security in the North. "When that step is taken, no one will 
be able to say you have not done anything." 

MOVING FORWARD TOGETHER 

9. (S) The President said he shares General Ward's views. 
He noted the frank and excellent working relationship he has 
with Ambassador Milovanovic, noting wryly that he is 
sometimes embarrassed by, but always appreciates, her 
directness. Returning to security questions, he described 
his childhood memory of "the dance of death" from the village 
in which he grew up: If you dance too far ahead, you die; if 
you dance too far behind, you die; if you do not dance at 
all, you die. That is the way it is in the fight against the 
Salafists, he said. We have no choice but to move ahead 
together. 

10. (S) Chief of Defense General Gabriel Poudiougou 
mentioned that the Algerian Special Forces Commander had just 
left Bamako November 26 after a two day visit in which he 
worked with his Malian counterparts to establish a 
transmission network and a better cooperative working 
arrangement on the ground. Colonel Amadou Gueye, in charge 
of military cooperation at the MOD, said that a mixed 
committee for joint military cooperation has been set up, and 
the fourth meeting is scheduled for December 15 in Tessalit, 
Mali. It is to be attended by an Algerian General. ATT said 
he is planning a trip to Algiers to ask Bouteflika for air 
support, shortly after the Tessalit meeting. 

ATT THOUGHTS ON ALGERIA 

11. (S) ATT then asked the Ambassador and General Ward if 
he could speak to them privately. In that meeting, he 
mentioned that he had gone to see Libyan leader Muammar 
al-Qadhafi and, contrary to the view of some, he is the most 
interested of all in a head of state summit in Bamako. ATT 
said that, after Tabaski (November 28), he will be going to 
see President Bouteflika and sending Malian Foreign Minister 

BAMAKO 00000776 003 OF 003 


Moctar Ouane to the other countries to find a date for the 
summit. 

12. (S) ATT said he believes Bouteflika and the Algerian 
leadership genuinely want to cooperate, although they have 
real doubts about Mali's resolve. His visit is intended 
inter alia to dispel these doubts. ATT said he thinks 
Algeria's intelligence services and army are holding up 
cooperation, and believes the Algerian army is infiltrated 
with Salafists. He is nevertheless pleased with the improved 
cooperation with Algeria, and said a lot is riding on 
concrete outcomes of the December 15 meeting in Tessalit. He 
wants the heads of state summit to take place first, and then 
to be prepared to start operations within a week or so. This 
implies that the cooperation already has to be working, in 
advance of the summit. 

XXXXXXXXXXXX 

XXXXXXXXXXXX

15. (S) General Ward said the United States will continue 
to support Mali's efforts with training and equipment. He 
pledged to follow up with the Algerians, telling them how 
important the next delegation meeting is, and conveying ATT's 
commitment. 

16. (U) General Ward cleared this message. 

MILOVANOVIC 

MILOVANOVIC