Currently released so far... 1947 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/28
2010/12/27
2010/12/26
2010/12/25
2010/12/24
2010/12/23
2010/12/22
2010/12/21
2010/12/20
2010/12/19
2010/12/18
2010/12/17
2010/12/16
2010/12/15
2010/12/14
2010/12/13
2010/12/12
2010/12/11
2010/12/10
2010/12/09
2010/12/08
2010/12/07
2010/12/06
2010/12/05
2010/12/04
2010/12/03
2010/12/02
2010/12/01
2010/11/30
2010/11/29
2010/11/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Paris
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Browse by tag
CU
CO
CH
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CI
CS
CVIS
CA
CBW
CASC
CD
CV
CMGT
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
COUNTERTERRORISM
COUNTER
EG
EFIN
EZ
ETRD
ETTC
ECON
EUN
ELAB
EU
EINV
EAID
EMIN
ENRG
ECPS
EN
ER
ET
ES
EPET
EUC
EI
EAIR
EAGR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ENVR
EINVETC
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
EXTERNAL
ECIP
EINDETRD
IV
IR
IS
IZ
IAEA
IN
IT
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
INRB
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
ID
ITPHUM
IO
IRAQI
ITALY
ITALIAN
IMO
KNNP
KWBG
KU
KPAL
KGHG
KPAO
KAWK
KISL
KHLS
KSUM
KSPR
KDEM
KJUS
KCRM
KGCC
KPIN
KDRG
KTFN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KN
KS
KCOR
KZ
KE
KFRD
KTIP
KIPR
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KGIC
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KDEV
KWMN
KTIA
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KPKO
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KNPP
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
MOPS
MARR
MNUC
MX
MASS
MCAP
MO
MIL
MTCRE
ML
MR
MZ
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MPOS
MAR
MD
MEPP
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PINS
PREF
PK
PE
PBTS
POGOV
PARM
PROP
PINL
PL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
PAK
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09PARIS1355, FRENCH OFFICIALS REPEAT DISARMAMENT CONCERNS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09PARIS1355.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09PARIS1355 | 2009-10-02 16:04 | 2010-12-23 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Paris |
VZCZCXRO0394
PP RUEHDBU RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHFR #1355/01 2751608
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021608Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7277
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHYY/GENEVA CD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001355
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2019
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM KACT PREL FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH OFFICIALS REPEAT DISARMAMENT CONCERNS
REF: A. PARIS 1039
¶B. PARIS POINTS FOR 10/2/2009
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathy Allegrone, Reasons 1.
4(b), (d).
¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: French officials, including senior
presidency staff, have once again stressed their concern that
U.S. disarmament policy might lead to political pressure on
France to make further cuts to its own nuclear arsenal,
pressure France would resist. Nevertheless, the GOF says it
wants to ensure any disagreements with the United States over
disarmament not prevent cooperation towards achieving
concrete progress on nonproliferation issues leading up to
and at the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review
Conference. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C/NF) Elysee (presidency) Strategic Advisor Francois
Richier told Pol M/C on October 1 that U.S.-French
differences on disarmament are "psychological," and that,
while France supports the United States reducing its nuclear
arsenal, it must not try to impose a "demonization" of
nuclear weapons or reduce their role in military strategy.
Repeating an argument the French have used before (ref A)
Richier said the nuclear deterrent is part of France's
identity, adding that France's conventional capabilities are
not as strong as those of the United States. While France
welcomes extended deterrence and NATO guarantees, the GOF
will continue to rely on its own arsenal. Therefore, France
would reject any suggestion that it join in multilateral
nuclear arms reduction talks ("if you ask us, we will just
say 'No!'"). According to Richier, this will remain a
redline for France even if the United States eventually
reduces its own arsenal to a size closer to France's, since
the GOF bases the size of its deterrent on its evaluation of
potential threats, not on the size of another country's
arsenal, especially that of the U.S., which is not a security
threat to France in any case.
¶3. (C/NF) Richier said France is, however, looking forward to
talking about multilateral disarmament measures other than
arms reduction, such as dismantling testing sites or
transforming nuclear material to make it suitable for
civilian use. France also supports a Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty (FMCT), though not one that addresses stockpiles.
Richier also cautioned about spending too much time creating
a comprehensive verification regime for an FMCT, saying that
it would be better to set up a flexible verification system
quickly to get a treaty signed without undue delay, since
France's main strategic goal with an FMCT is to stop China
from producing fissile materials.
¶4. (C/NF) Earlier the same day, the same message was
previewed by MFA NPT officer Celine Jurgensen (ref B), who,
along with Richier, will attend upcoming P3 consultations on
the margins of the CSIS conference in Washington on October
¶9. Jurgensen said that, despite some disagreements during
the negotiation process, France was quite happy with the
resolution adopted at the September 24 UN Security Council
Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation Summit, chaired by
President Obama. She added that, although France would have
ideally preferred the resolution to mention Iran and North
Korea by name, the text was an excellent model for a
potential product for the 2010 NPT RevCon. Jurgensen also
warned against any suggestion that post-START negotiations be
broadened to include other nuclear powers, saying France
would simply not disarm further in the foreseeable future.
She added that she did not think arguments trying to leverage
current U.S. and Russian disarmament efforts to gain
concessions on nonproliferation from other countries would
work. Like Richier, however, she added that ongoing P3
consultations were useful and that France and the United
States clearly shared goals on nonproliferation issues.
Jurgensen said that P3 consultations should focus on creating
an effective outreach strategy focused on both Non-Aligned
Movement states as well as European nations like Sweden that
might be willing to support watered down nonproliferation
language at the 2010 NPT RevCon.
¶5. (C/NF) SUMMARY: The message that France is not willing to
further reduce its nuclear arsenal is not new, though French
officials seem to be making it ever more pointedly. There is
a clear will to work with the United States (and the UK) to
advance shared nonproliferation goals at the 2010 RevCon and
in other fora, but as consultations continue the GOF seems to
be growing more worried about perceived differences in our
disarmament policies. Clearly laying out our own redlines
may either ease French concerns about the extent of these
differences - thus limiting the danger of French
obstructionism - or at least encourage the French to focus
PARIS 00001355 002 OF 002
less on their fears of calls for arms reductions and more on
areas, including on disarmament, where cooperation with its
P3 partners may be more fruitful. END SUMMARY.
RIVKIN