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Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI347, ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE REITERATES IRAN CONCERNS FOR S/SRAP
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09ABUDHABI347 | 2009-04-05 12:12 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Abu Dhabi |
VZCZCXRO9925
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHAD #0347 0951254
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051254Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2332
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0644
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000347
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR S, S/SRAP HOLBROOKE AND S/SAGSWA ROSS
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP AND NEA/IR
E.O. 12958: 03/24/2019
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PARM MOPS IR AF PK AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE REITERATES IRAN CONCERNS FOR S/SRAP
HOLBROOKE
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD G. OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: During a March 24 meeting with Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, Abu
Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) expressed his grave
concerns about the Iranian threat to the region. MbZ said the
Iranian response to the Nowruz message was primarily for domestic
consumption, but that the Iranian leadership is concerned that
dialogue with the West represents a regime threat. He said Iran
would obtain a nuclear weapon unless the regime could be "split from
inside" before nuclear capability was achieved. Foreign Minister
Abdullah bin Zayed argued for continued Gulf consultation in
conjunction with any U.S. efforts to engage Iran. (Other topics
reported septel.) End Summary.
NOWRUZ STATEMENT
----------------
¶2. (S/NF) MbZ began by telling Amb. Holbrooke that Khamenei's
response to President's Nowruz statement was designed to send a
message to the millions of Iranians who saw the statement on the
Internet that there will be no debate on engagement with the United
States and/or the West. MbZ opined that Khamenei had to deliver the
message personally as an Ahmedinejad response would have fueled
domestic debate. Commenting that Khamenei was conveying Iran's
fundamental lack of trust in the United States, MbZ said the Iranians
want an apology "for everything from Carter to Bush." He added that
the uncharacteristic speed of Khamenei's response indicates the
extent of the perceived threat that improved relations with the West
might represent to the leadership's control over the country.
Specifically, the Iranian regime fears the United States will demand
the renunciation of its nuclear program, which would be politically
impossible.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS A CERTAINTY, UNLESS REGIME FALLS
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶3. (S/NF) MbZ told Holbrooke he was "100 percent" convinced Iran will
complete its nuclear weapons program. He candidly stated his
personal belief that negotiations with Iran were irrelevant and a
military solution would only delay the program, not derail it. MbZ
said that there was a "third way" between these unacceptable options:
Iran is domestically very fragile, and the only way to prevent it
from acquiring nuclear weapons was to "split them from inside."
¶4. (S/NF) Turning to his concerns about an armed confrontation, MbZ
said war with Iran would only harm the UAE. He is deeply concerned
that the current Israeli government will initiate military action
without consultation. An Israeli attack on Iran would have little
impact on Iran's capabilities, but MbZ was certain Iran would
respond. MbZ argued that the leadership believes its own lies, which
were "proven" by Iran's success in Basra. Today's conventional
Iranian weapons would target the Gulf, while Iran continues to expand
its missile program with the hope of reaching the West.
CONSULT US
----------
¶5. (S/NF) UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan
(AbZ) stressed the importance of a continuation of the P5 plus 1 plus
GCC plus 3 coordination on Iran. AbZ said that such consultation in
2008 "agitated" Iran, but sent a message to Russia and China and
European allies that the Gulf is seriously concerned about Iranian
hegemony. Iran's regional hegemony and nuclear program are two
issues that the West cannot tackle separately. AbZ noted that
countries in the region ("some friends") are concerned that the
United States, especially under the current administration, would
engage Iran at the expense of ties with the region. AbZ said the
President's Nowruz message supported this theory. He concluded, "The
more you engage Iran, the more you must engage the Gulf states."
(Ambassador Olson's comment: Abdullah's reference to "friends" was
Emirati politesse - the UAE is deeply concerned that we are preparing
to trade, and is interpreting the Nowruz greeting in that way.)
¶6. (SBU) Ambassador Holbrooke has cleared this message.
OLSON