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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW226, PROVOCATIONS FROM RUSSIAN SECURITY SERVICES
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MOSCOW226 | 2009-01-30 15:03 | 2010-12-01 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHMO #0226/01 0301525
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301525Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1706
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
SS E C R E T MOSCOW 000226
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR RS SOCI
SUBJECT: PROVOCATIONS FROM RUSSIAN SECURITY SERVICES
REF: MOSCOW 00202
Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle. Reason: 1.4 (d).
¶1. (S) Summary. With their usual light touch and unique sense
of timing, the security services appear to be tightening the
screws on what they see as Russia's internal and foreign
enemies along three fronts. First was a confidential letter
from the Federal Security Service (FSB) demanding that USAID
stop funding NGOs in the North Caucasus. Second, the Interior
Ministry has brought pressure on the liberal Higher School of
Economics to expel students who took part in anti-government
demonstrations in December. Third, and most disturbing, we
believe the FSB is behind a personal smear attack
XXXXXXXXXXXX the National Democratic Institute's Moscow
office (NDI) that was emailed to NDI and USAID staff this week.
The second provocation has become a public issue, with
critical articles even in the popular tabloid, Moskovskiy
Komsomolets, on Ren TV, and commentary on prominent blog
sites. Taken together, we assess that hard-line silovik
elements are testing the political waters at home and
potentially making waves at a time of otherwise positive
signals of interest in improving US-Russian relations. End
Summary.
Warning to USAID
----------------
¶2. (S) A January 17 letter from the FSB, sent through liaison
channels, explicitly warned against continued USAID funding
for NGOs in the North Caucasus. Citing a November trip by a
named USAID officer, the FSB alleged that US funding to the
region was "incompetent" and that USAID was not in a position
to guarantee that funds provided for humanitarian programs
did not fall into the hands of illegal armed groups. Given
the tensions in South Ossetia, as well as the conflict in the
Middle East, the FSB gave notice that "it is necessary to
refrain from financing any NGO in the North Caucasus,
regardless of USAID's goals." The letter closed with an
ominous admonition that unless USAID stops its "incompetent
actions," the FSB would implement strict preventative
measures, including the denial of visas.
¶3. (S) The FSB letter attempted to justify its position by
highlighting the complexity of nationalities and religions in
the North Caucasus, the prevalence of extremist movements,
and the predominant role played by family loyalties as
factors that made funding of NGOs in the region dangerous.
The FSB made implicit threats that information about US
funding of illegal groups would likely be made public through
the media, damaging US-Russian counterterrorism efforts.
Further, the letter noted that "incompetent actions" on the
part of the "Embassy sections, like USAID" could escalate
tensions in regions beyond the borders of the North Caucasus
to the detriment of US and Russian interests. When the
Ambassador protested this FSB salvo, Deputy Foreign Minister
Ryabkov claimed (credibly) that the security service
complaints had not been coordinated with the MFA.
Warning to Students
-------------------
¶4. (SBU) In mid-January, the Moscow branch of the MVD issued
a letter to the Higher School of Economics, raising the issue
of four students (possibly six) who participated in December
opposition marches with the veiled recommendation that they
be expelled. According to press reports, the letter warned
"implementation of un-sanctioned mass acts was one of the
forms of extremist activity, carrying a high level of
societal danger, and demands adequate reactive measures on
the part of the law enforcement organs." The MVD called on
the institute to look into the circumstance of the students'
participation in the opposition protests and to consider the
efficacy of continuing their education. Further, the letter
sought comments from the heads of the Politics and Economics
departments about extremism, as well as personal statements
from the four students. MVD sources told the newspaper
Moskovskiy Komsomolets (MK) that they were "legally required"
to inform the place of employment or school of any citizens
violating social stability.
¶5. (C) The institute will hold a meeting on February 4 to
consider its response, but public comments by the director
and rector suggest that the school considers such political
activity to be a "personal" decision, beyond the scope of
institute censure. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX
"no way" that the institute would adhere to the
recommendations of the MVD and underscored the unanimity
of the faculty and student body on this issue. Nezavisimaya
Gazeta criticized the letter, seeing it as a demonstration of
the government's "panic" after the anti-tariff protests and
highlighting the "Soviet" aspect of going after politically
"unreliable" students. Besides the usual lineup of opposition
newspapers and websites, the MK article ensures that a
broader swath of society will learn about this incident --
already it has spawned a sharp reaction of support for the
students and condemnation of the MVD in Russia's blogosphere.
¶6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that XXXXXXXXXXXX
was sure that other institutes and universities had received
similar letters, but had chosen not to make the silovik
demands public or had quietly capitulated. Our consulate
in St. Petersburg noted last year's closing of the European
University, ostensibly for "fire safety" issues, because of
the Political Science department had taken a grant to do
research on electoral politics in Russia.
Getting Ugly and Personal with NDI
----------------------------------
¶7. (C) On January 29, USAID FSNs received an email from
XXXXXXXXXXXX with a photoshopped image of
XXXXXXXXXXXX reclining with an underage
child. The picture was attached to a message, ostensibly from
a Russian citizen, which accused XXXXXXXXXXXX of raping
her 9-year old daughter. This latest provocation falls on the
heels of a scandal in Murmansk alleging NDI interference in
local elections and harassment of NDI staff XXXXXXXXXXXX.
The Ambassador met with representatives from NDI on January
30 on harassment of the NGO, reported septel.
Panic or Provocation
--------------------
¶8. (C) Emboldened by the economic crisis, the silovik forces
have taken the initiative to stir the waters of Russian
politics, not only with those letters, but also with the
proposed revision of the law on treason, on jury trials, and
the heavy-handed response to the protests in Vladivostok.
Some of those initiatives have been blunted directly, such as
Medvedev's decision to revise the proposed law on treason,
others by publicizing the issue (the letter to the Higher
School of Economics, for example, received coverage in the
popular tabloid MK and on Ren TV) -- suggesting an
intensification of inter-elite conflict.
¶9. (C) Comment. We cannot rule out that those provocations
may in part be directed at complicating efforts to improve
US-Russian relations. At a time when both Putin and Medvedev
have indicated the potential for starting with a clean slate
in relations with the new Obama administration, those within
the security services who see value (including to their
budgets) from continued tensions or whose world view is
predicated on US-Russia conflict are likely under pressure to
play a spoiler role. Ambassador plans to raise all of those
incidents forcefully in high-level meetings next week to send
a message back flagging the risks inherent in allowing rogue
elements to run amok in the relationship. End Comment.
BEYRLE