Currently released so far... 1947 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/28
2010/12/27
2010/12/26
2010/12/25
2010/12/24
2010/12/23
2010/12/22
2010/12/21
2010/12/20
2010/12/19
2010/12/18
2010/12/17
2010/12/16
2010/12/15
2010/12/14
2010/12/13
2010/12/12
2010/12/11
2010/12/10
2010/12/09
2010/12/08
2010/12/07
2010/12/06
2010/12/05
2010/12/04
2010/12/03
2010/12/02
2010/12/01
2010/11/30
2010/11/29
2010/11/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Monterrey
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Paris
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Browse by tag
CU
CO
CH
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CI
CS
CVIS
CA
CBW
CASC
CD
CV
CMGT
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
COUNTERTERRORISM
COUNTER
EG
EFIN
EZ
ETRD
ETTC
ECON
EUN
ELAB
EU
EINV
EAID
EMIN
ENRG
ECPS
EN
ER
ET
ES
EPET
EUC
EI
EAIR
EAGR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ENVR
EINVETC
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
EXTERNAL
ECIP
EINDETRD
IV
IR
IS
IZ
IAEA
IN
IT
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
INRB
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
ID
ITPHUM
IO
IRAQI
ITALY
ITALIAN
IMO
KNNP
KWBG
KU
KPAL
KGHG
KPAO
KAWK
KISL
KHLS
KSUM
KSPR
KDEM
KJUS
KCRM
KGCC
KPIN
KDRG
KTFN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KN
KS
KCOR
KZ
KE
KFRD
KTIP
KIPR
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KGIC
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KDEV
KWMN
KTIA
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KPKO
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KNPP
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
KFIN
MOPS
MARR
MNUC
MX
MASS
MCAP
MO
MIL
MTCRE
ML
MR
MZ
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MPOS
MAR
MD
MEPP
PGOV
PREL
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PINS
PREF
PK
PE
PBTS
POGOV
PARM
PROP
PINL
PL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PA
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
PAK
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD2524, SCENESETTER FOR PM GILANI'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ISLAMABAD2524.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08ISLAMABAD2524 | 2008-07-25 13:01 | 2010-11-30 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Islamabad |
O 251326Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8040
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY
NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 002524
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PM GILANI'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary. Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani
will be anxious to prove that he is committed to fighting
"Pakistan's war" on terrorism and will outline the GOP's
partial response to the July demands presented by CJCS
Mullen/DDCIA Kappes. Gilani will publicly support the
coaliton's "negotiations first" counter-terrorism strategy
and defend Pakistani sovereignty in the face of reported
plans for unilateral U.S. action. Privately, he will agree
that force is sometimes necessary and assert he is prepared
to use it. However, coalition strains and governance
gridlock are limiting Gilani's ability to coordinate either
security or economic policy. He likely will repeat requests
for "actionable intelligence" and suggest the need for
increased U.S./ISAF operations on the Afghan side of the
border. We should maintain pressure for specific
counter-terrorism (CT) action and condition future Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) assistance on Pakistani agreement to
training that will increase its counter-insurgency
capabilities.
¶2. (C/NF) Summary continued. Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
(PML-N) leader Nawaz Sharif has used his "go Musharraf go"
campaign to become Pakistan's most popular leader today. To
bolster his sagging Pakistan People's Party (PPP) popularity,
PM Gilani may ask for quiet support of a dignified exit
(resignation) for President Musharraf; in contrast, Musharraf
has asked that we reaffirm U.S. support for him as President.
Musharraf continues to debate dissolving the National
Assembly, a step we believe will lead to widespread unrest
and increase calls for his departure.
¶3. (C/NF) Summary continued. Gilani likely will ask for
faster delivery of Coalition Support Fund (CSF)
reimbursements, endorse the Biden/Lugar bill to double
economic aid to Pakistan, and support passage of
Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) legislation. He will
welcome offers of food security and energy assistance to help
overcome rising food and fuel inflation and rolling power
blackouts. He may ask for support to convince Riyadh to
agree to Pakistan's request to defer $5.9 billion in oil
payments. Gilani fully supports efforts to repair strained
relations with Afghanistan and India. End Summary.
Filling a Leadership Vacuum
---------------------------
¶4. (C/NF) Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani is well-meaning,
pro-American and anxious to convince us that he is committed
to fighting "Pakistan's war" against terrorism. The
challenge is turning good intentions into sustainable action.
Gilani presides over a fragile coalition mired in governance
gridlock over the issue of President Musharraf's future. The
real centers of power -- PPP Co-Chair Asif Zardari and PML-N
leader Nawaz Sharif -- sit outside government fighting for
political supremacy. Gilani supports what has been improving
Ministry of Interior CT cooperation, but he has limited power
to force the Army and the intelligence services
(Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)) to battle a growing
militant insurgency. His visit to the White House may well
empower him to do more. With the withdrawal of Nawaz
Sharif's economic ministers, the coalition lacks the
expertise to tackle spiraling debt, food and fuel inflation,
capital flight, and rolling blackouts.
¶5. (C/NF) Gilani will be seeking public assurances that the
U.S. supports Pakistan's new civilian government, but the
uneasy Zardari-Nawaz marriage of convenience may not last
much longer. When the coalition breaks apart, Zardari will
need to bolster his slim parliamentary majority with other
partners. President Musharraf believes his party can be one
of those partners, and we agree. But his "go Musharraf go"
campaign has made Nawaz Sharif the most popular leader in
Pakistan today. Zardari and Gilani fear they cannot
politically afford to continue working with Musharraf and may
raise this in Washington. In contrast, Musharraf has asked
that the USG make it clear to Gilani that the U.S. continues
to support him as President. Chief of Army Staff General
Kayani prefers to remain out of politics, if for no other
reason than a reluctance to take on twin security and
economic crises. We believe he will support Musharraf's
resignation with dignity, if the prospect of impeachment
becomes real.
¶6. (C/NF) Musharraf continues to debate the possibility of
dissolving the National Assembly and imposing a technocratic
government; we believe this scenario will provoke unrest and
increase calls for Musharraf's departure. We should support
Gilani now and through a coalition breakup. Nawaz currently
does not have the votes to bring down the coalition.
Fulfilling Promises
-------------------
¶7. (S/NF) We have learned since 9/11 that Pakistan
responds, periodically, to U.S. pressure on
counter-terrorism; we should continue to press for action on
specific agenda items. The GOP has responded to the CJCS
Mullen/DDCIA Kappes visit in July by arresting several
Taliban shura members in Quetta, signed an agreement to
install cellphone towers in the tribal areas (FATA), is
initiating an Army operation in North Waziristan, and we
expect they will allow another B-300 surveillance aircraft to
operate. These steps will help disrupt cross-border attacks
and improve our intelligence capabilities.
¶8. (S/NF) However, the GOP has not targeted Siraj Haqqani
or his network; nor have they arrested Commander Nazir or
Gulbaddin Hekmatyar. These militants are responsible for
much of the 40 percent increase in cross-border attacks on
our troops in Afghanistan this year. The Army/ISI can do the
job, but they cling to "old think" -- the belief that it is
better to manipulate militants through infiltration, payoffs
and "divide and conquer" strategy than fight extremists on
the battlefield. They fear military action would provoke a
tribal war they cannot control, but the GOP strategy has
failed and the government is losing territory to extremists
every day. While acknowledging that elements of ISI may be
out of control, Musharraf and Kayani remain reluctant to
replace ISI Director Nadeem Taj.
Bolstering CT Strategy
----------------------
¶9. (C/NF) Gilani will proudly explain the GOP's
three-pronged CT strategy: political engagement; economic
development; and force when needed. He likely will claim
recent (minimal) Frontier Corps action in the tribal areas
(Hangu and Bara) and (weak) coalition concensus as evidence
of GOP resolve to execute that strategy. We should
acknowledge Pakistani sacrifices in the war on terror.
Gilani believes the coalition must build popular support for
military action, and General Kayani agrees. But we should
stress that militants are exploiting the coalition's
"negotiations first" policy to plan and launch attacks
against Pakistani and U.S. targets.
¶10. (S/NF) Gilani will repeat GOP requests for "actionable
intelligence" and may suggest that the U.S. and ISAF beef up
border patrols and stop the drug trade in Afghanistan that
finances arms and militant operations. We should respond
that the GOP knows better than we do the location of Haqqani,
Nazir and Hekmatyar; most al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries
are in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. If Gilani suggests
improved regional (especially Gulf) intelligence sharing, we
should welcome that initiative. Zardari has just proposed to
us a September conference hosted by the UAE with Pakistan,
India, Afghanistan, the U.K., the U.S., and NATO observers to
discuss the situation in the tribal areas and along the
border. This idea has merit, too.
¶11. (C/NF) Gilani will thank the U.S. for its five-year
$750 million FATA development program and may ask for more.
Despite security challenges, USAID is implementing small
projects in five of the seven FATA agencies that will
eventually create 120,000 short-term jobs for young Pashtuns
who otherwise would be tempted to join the Taliban. USAID
is developing a program to preposition relief packages to
deliver (in the GOP's name) to villages after military
action; we should encourage the GOP to increase its own
civil-military programs to provide relief as part of its
counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy.
¶12. (C/NF) Largely because of pride, the Pakistani Army
remains reluctant to accept COIN training for itself or the
badly trained and under-equipped Frontier Corps. We should
tell Gilani that future FMF support will be conditioned on
the GOP's willingness to accept COIN and close air support
training. We should assure Gilani that we will continue
current efforts to train and equip para-military forces like
the Levies and push him to accept pending training for the
Frontier Corps. Pakistan now has six military officers
working in the tripartite Torkham Border Coordination Center
(BCC); we should press for Gilani's concurrence to identify
two BCC sites in Pakistan. Gilani may raise the Pakistani
request to use FMF for F-16 mid-life upgrades; we currently
are seeking Congressional support for this request.
Fixing the Economy
------------------
¶13. (C/NF) Economic growth for the current fiscal year is
expected to be 5.8 percent, well below the target of 7.2
percent. The fiscal deficit is projected to be 7 percent of
GDP versus a target of 4 percent; GOP borrowing from the
State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has reached an all-time high of
USD 8 billion. Pakistan's trade deficit rose to USD 17
billion, up from USD 11 billion last year, as lackluster
export growth fell far short of increasing imports. Savings
and foreign investment both declined. Pakistan's rupee has
lost 16.8 percent of its value since January and is at record
lows. We support approval of a pending USD 500 million World
Bank loan for Pakistan, conditioned on a coherent plan for
reducing food and energy subisidies. Gilani may ask for
speedier delivery of Coalition Support Fund reimbursements
(approximately USD 1 billion per year) and endorse the
recently introduced Biden/Lugar bill to double economic aid
to Pakistan.
¶14. (SBU) Not a single megawatt of electricity has been
added to the national grid since 2000, despite population
growth and economic expansion. Industrial production is
threatened by blackouts and unemployment is rising. Petroleum
and electricity subsidies account for the bulk of the fiscal
deficit and have continued to rise with skyrocketing
international oil prices. The GOP is paying USD 554 million
per month for subsidies on petroleum and will attempt to
reduce these subsidies despite the intense popularity of such
measures. Energy accounts for 29.3 percent of Pakistan's
imports, and growth in exports cannot cover the increases in
international commodity prices. Saudi Arabia is considering
a Pakistani request to defer $5.9 billion in oil payments;
Gilani may request help in convincing Riyadh to agree. USAID
will launch a three year program to assist with energy policy
issues and energy efficiency and we are offering to fund a
USGS mapping survey to identify commercial mineral deposits
and potential energy sources. Gilani will attend in
Washington a World Bank investment roundtable focused on
developing Pakistan's Thar coal field reserves.
¶15. (U) Gilani will welcome the USG offer of food
assistance; he estimates that Pakistan needs help obtaining
3.5 million metric tons of wheat to stave off shortages this
year. Pakistanis have suffered monthly double digit food
price inflation since September 2007. Over 100 million
Pakistanis live on less than 2 dollars per day, including 25
million living on less than one dollar per day. The World
Food Program recently identified Pakistan as one of 40
countries at risk of food insecurity and recently raised its
estimate of at-risk individuals from 60 to 77 million, or 48
percent of Pakistan's population.
Repairing Regional Security
---------------------------
¶16. (C/NF) Zardari strongly supports improved ties with
India, irrespective of progress on Kashmir. Gilani called
Indian PM Singh this week and has agreed to meet with both
Singh and President Karzai in Sri Lanka following the
Washington trip. Gilani has approved the list of Pakistani
participants to the mini-jirga with Afghanistan. India and
Pakistan initiated the fifth round of their Composite
Dialogue in July and agreed to expand confidence building
measures in Kashmir. Gilani may ask for more pressure on
Congress for passage of Reconstruction Opportunity Zone
legislation which would benefit both Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
¶17. (C/NF) However, increased allegations of ISI involvement
in the July 7 bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul have
undermined regional relations. India and Pakistan are
investigating the incident; we are working with Kabul to
restart Pak-Afghan economic and military meetings cancelled
in the wake of the bombing. If asked, Gilani will state that
Pakistan will not impede approval of the India-IAEA
Safeguards Agreement. But Pakistan clearly would like
similar USG assistance to develop its own civilian nuclear
capability to meet growing energy demand. Negotiations
continue on the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.
¶18. (C/NF) We were disappointed that the Islamabad High
Court increased personal freedoms for Pakistani nuclear
scientist AQ Khan; if asked, Gilani will say that the GOP
continues to closely monitor Khan's activities.
PATTERSON
NNNN