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Viewing cable 07DUBAI59, UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' JANUARY 23 MEETING WITH UAE VICE
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
07DUBAI59 | 2007-01-28 08:08 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Dubai |
VZCZCXRO0724
RR RUEHBC RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDE #0059/01 0280812
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 280812Z JAN 07
FM AMCONSUL DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5072
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 2084
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 8134
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBAI 000059
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS MARR AE IR IS LE
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' JANUARY 23 MEETING WITH UAE VICE
PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER AND DUBAI RULER MOHAMMED BIN RASHID AL
MAKTOUM
REF: DUBAI 00018
DUBAI 00000059 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Paul R Sutphin, Consul General, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1.(C) Summary: In a January 23 meeting in Dubai with U/S Burns,
UAE Vice President, Prime Minister and Dubai Ruler Sheikh
Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum (MbR) expressed concern about the
potential negative impact on Dubai of possible future UN
sanctions against Iran; he urged the quiet US-UAE cooperation on
financial and export control restrictions against Iran, offering
to set up a "joint committee" to this end. He agreed that Iran
should not have nuclear weapons, but warned of the dire regional
consequences of military action. U/S Burns said the US would
protect its interests in the region and support Gulf governments
in resisting efforts by Iran to dominate the region. He
emphasized the importance of continued support for the Siniora
government in Lebanon, and the high priority the US put on a
renewed effort to move the Israelis and Palestinians toward
peace. U/S Burns raised the case of Amcit Vafa Valapour, which
has been under criminal investigation in Dubai for nearly 16
months without charges before a court(although under the local
system police charges have been filed); MbR asked his aides to
ensure the case moved forward as rapidly and transparently as
possible End Summary.
2.(C) On January 23, U/S for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns
met with MbR for one hour in MbR's downtown office. Burns was
accompanied by NEA PDAS Jim Jeffrey, the Ambassador, the Consul
General, P Staff assistant Herro Mustafa and ConGen notetaker.
MbR was accompanied by his sons Sheikh Hamdan (who chairs the
Dubai Executive Council, the Emirate's governing body) and
Sheikh Mayed; Minister for Cabinet Affairs (and Dubai Holdings
head) Mohammed Gergawi; federal Minister for Education Dr. Hanif
al Qasimi; Dubai General Security Service head Brigadier
Mohammed al Qemzi; Dubai World head Sultan bin Sulayem; and
Emirates Airlines chairman and Dubai Civil Aviation head Sheikh
Ahmed bin Sayed al Maktoum. U/S Burns expressed admiration for
the Dubai's rapid development, hailing it as an open and
productive model that was now being emulated throughout the
region.
3.(C) Lebanon: U/S Burns conveyed the gratitude of the Lebanese
government for financial and other assistance from the UAE. MbR
said the UAE understands that the Siniora government needs
regional support. U/S Burns urged continued assistance, noting
the US will soon offer the Siniora government $1 billion for
security and reconstruction efforts.
4.(C) Iran sanctions: U/S Burns highlighted the significance of
the June 2006 international offer to negotiate with Iran to
resolve the nuclear issue--the first official US offer to
negotiate with Tehran in 27 years. Tehran had rejected this
broadly-supported, reasonable proposal, which offered economic
incentives such as sanctions relief and the sale of civilian
airliners in addition to negotiations. U/S Burns said that the
UNSCR 1737's limited sanctions were a first step to pressure
Iran to compromise, but that absent Iranian movement another,
more restrictive, sanctions resolution is likely in February.
The US was also taking bilateral action through Treasury
designations against Iranian banks that were funding terrorism.
5.(C) MbR expressed willingness to cooperate in financial
restrictions against Iran, but urged that the cooperation be
conducted quietly; he offered to set up a "joint committee" to
do so (he did not offer details); he later repeated this offer
with regard to military transfers (see para 8). He voiced
concern regarding the potential negative impact of economic
sanctions on Dubai, and against the "good Iranians" -- including
Dubai's estimated 350,000 Iranians residents. U/S Burns and
Ambassador Sison expressed readiness to engage with Dubai on
financial cooperation against Iran. (Note: the number of
resident Iranians was supplied by Al Qemzi, and is higher that
the 200-300 thousand usual cited by the Dubai officials.)
6.(C) Iran and Gulf Security: U/S Burns stated that the US will
protect its interests and support its allies, like the UAE, in
the face of Iranian attempts to dominate the Gulf. This is why
we have stationed a second carrier battle group there, and have
detained Iranian agents in Iraq who were providing arms and bomb
components used to kill US troops. MbR stated that the UAE does
not want Iran to have nuclear weapons, and urged continued
international pressure on Iran, but expressed deep concern about
the destabilizing consequences to the UAE and to region of a
military strike. He urged that the US find a way to stop or
disarm Iran without using military force. U/S Burns reiterated
DUBAI 00000059 002.2 OF 002
that the US wants a diplomatic solution, and is working with the
UN and its allies toward this end; strong UAE support was
important to this effort.
7.(C) MbR expressed hope for change inside Iran, which U/S Burns
echoed. Burns noted the US wants to support the influence of
moderate Iranians and encourage Iran to engage in negotiations.
Minister Gergawi mentioned rumors that Supreme leader Khamenei
is suffering from prostate cancer. Gergawi opined that the
merchant class in Iran has been pressuring Ahmadinejad over his
failing economic policy. He asserted that the growing sectarian
conflict in Iraq, as well as the hanging of Saddam Hussein
(which, he implied, was inspired by Iranian pressure), have now
undermined the possibility of a regional alliance between
extremist Sunnis and Shia. Regional Sunnis now blame Iran for
instability in Lebanon and Iraq. (Note: Gergawi's family is of
Iranian origin, and he acts as one of MbR's principal advisors
on Iran.)
8.(C) Security cooperation: U/S Burns called the Gulf
Cooperation Council a good forum for quiet security cooperation,
and reiterated that the US seeks a close, productive dialogue
with the UAE on Gulf security. The US opposes arms sales to
Iran and will urge its partners in the European Union, Russia
and the Middle East to cooperate on this front. MbR reiterated
his offer to set up a committee to cooperate on these issues.
9.(C) Israel/Palestinians: U/S Burns stressed that the US
believes progress between Israel and the Palestinians toward
peace is central to regional stability, and supports the
creation of a Palestinian state. This would be "the best
thing," MbR replied; a peace deal would make radical groups like
HAMAS "everyone's enemy". Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas
should be supported, particularly since HAMAS is funded by Iran.
MbR noted UAE assistance was again flowing to the Palestinians,
although it had been suspended for a time because of corruption
concerns. U/S Burns said the US is careful to ensure its
assistance is going to the Palestinian people, rather than the
HAMAS government, and is confident in the assistance mechanisms
now in place.
10.(C) Valapour case: U/S Burns raised the case of Amcit Vafa
Valapour, who has been under criminal investigation in Dubai for
nearly 16 months. U/S Burns said the US sought return of
Valapour's passport, which has been held by the Dubai police.
He underscored that, while he was taking no substantive position
on the merits of the case, the US believes the case should move
forward with due process as quickly as possible. MbR was
unfamiliar with the case, and turned to Gergawi for background.
Gergawi outlined the Dubai government view of the case, saying
the bottom line is that Valapour and his non-USC partners had
profited from insider information in a deal on the Dubai Metro
project with a corrupt Dubai official. "We don't tolerate
corruption," Gergawi concluded. The Consul General noted that
he had recently met with the Dubai Attorney General (reftel) on
the case. The AG had agreed to meet with Valapour's US and
Emirati representatives to help to resolve the issue. MbR asked
his aides to ensure the case moved forward as quickly and
transparently as possible, and promised Valapour would receive
fair treatment.
11.(C) Afghanistan: U/S Burns expressed appreciation for UAE
assistance in Afghanistan, and urged support for the Karzai
government. MbR asserted the UAE and US are partners against
drugs, money laundering, and terrorism and in Afghanistan. He
said the best weapon against the Taliban was economic
investment. U/S Burns outlined ongoing reconstruction efforts,
and noted the difficulty of creating economically viable
substitutes for drug crops. MbR said Karzai is reluctant to
tackle the drug issue because he fears decreased support in the
provinces.
12.(C) Comment: MbR offered little new, other than his somewhat
vague offer to create a bilateral committee to address financial
and arms/technology flows to Iran. He is clearly concerned
regarding the prospect of more comprehensive UN economic
sanctions, given that Iran is Dubai's largest trading partner,
an assertion often cited by Dubai officials (although good
Dubai/Iran trade numbers are hard to come by). We will follow
up to try to get a better read on the scope of MbR's offer.
SUTPHIN