Cable Viewer

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Discussing cables
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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
05BRASILIA3124	2005-11-29 18:06	2010-12-23 07:07	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Brasilia

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 003124 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL AORC BR IR IAEA

REF: STATE 213341 

Classified By: PolCouns Dennis Hearne, 1.4 (B) & (D) 

¶1. (C) Embassy presented reftel demarche November 28 to Santiago Mourao, director of the Foreign Ministry's Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies Division. Mourao said the GOB had maintained frequent contact with the EU3 on the issue and had also had two recent discussions of the issue with the Iranians. 

¶2. (C) Mourao said that the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, who visited Brazil in October, had thanked the Brazilians for their "support", referring to Brazil's abstention on the IAEA resolution concerning the Iranian nuclear program. The Brazilians told him that the GOB vote in the IAEA BOG should not be interpreted as an endorsement of Iranian actions, but rather as a judgment that referral to the UNSC is not the most appropriate tactical course of action. The GOB stressed that, while all countries have the right to develop nuclear energy, that right is conditioned on full compliance with international commitments such as the NPT and IAEA safeguards agreements. In the case of Iran, Brazil sees a necessity to make particular efforts to repair the lack of confidence on the part of the international community regarding Iran's program. The GOB told the Minister that it expects Iran to make particular efforts to cooperate with the IAEA in a more proactive and transparent manner. 

¶3. (C) Mourao said he believes Iran is now being more forthcoming, but the pending issues have yet to be resolved. The GOB has told the GOI that it needs to suspend all enrichment activities and abide by the commitments it made concerning its program. Iran should restart negotiations with the EU3. Mourao added that Brazil supported the Russian initiative to transfer Iranian enrichment capabilities from Iran to Russia. This could be a useful confidence-building measure, even if it is not an ideal long-term solution. 

¶4. (C) The second discussion with Iran came after the new Iranian president made a speech in Tehran saying Iran was being treated in a discriminatory fashion when compared to the cases of South Korea and Brazil. The Foreign Ministry called in the Iranian Ambassador and told him such comments were not proper. The Iranian Ambassador blamed the problem on a translation error. 

¶5. (C) Mourao noted that the regular Undersecretary-level talks that Brazil holds with Iran have been postponed for "technical reasons." The real reason for the postponement is Brazilian displeasure with the Iranian president's public statements concerning Israel. 

LINEHAN