Cable Viewer

The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05MADRID1317.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
05MADRID1317	2005-04-06 11:11	2010-12-07 12:12	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Madrid

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MADRID 001317 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL CO SP EUN NATO VZ
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZAPATERO 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Bob Manzanares; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ) 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXX
========================= 
U.S.-SPAIN RELATIONS 
========================= 
¶23. (C) On bilateral relations, Zapatero said he would never 
ask the USG to do something it could not do and, in turn, did 
not want to be asked to do something he did not believe in. 
Zapatero said he understood President Bush was upset with his 
decision to withdraw Spanish forces from Iraq, but insisted 
that he had maintained a consistent position on Iraq, made 
clear this position in the election campaign, and said he had 
followed his convictions and commitments in carrying out the 
withdrawal.  He said he was not bothered by Washington's 
reaction; he could understand the President's perspective. 
 
¶24. (C) Zapatero regretted not having engaged with the U.S. 
prior to winning the 2004 election, but it wasn't because he 
wasn't available.  Zapatero complained that U.S. visitors to 
Spain did not seek him out during his four years as 
opposition leader.  The lack of contact was ironic since, the 
State Department had sponsored his 1990 participation in a 
group of young leaders who traveled to the U.S. as 
International Visitor grantees.  Zapatero said this was a 
good trip.  He learned then and subsequently that the U.S. 
was a great country with great successes, which sometimes 
also "created great problems." 
 
¶25. (C) Zapatero said he was aware that there would always be 
some hesitation on the part of the USG regarding his 
government, but also said he understood that "nothing is more 
important than deeds."   He pointed to Afghanistan as one 
demonstration of Spain's commitment to support the United 
States when our values coincide.  Spain would remain in 
Afghanistan as long as necessary to meet its commitment. 
MANZANARES