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Viewing cable 05MADRID395, SPAIN ON AFGHANISTAN, ISAF STAGE II CONTRIBUTION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05MADRID395 2005-02-02 16:04 2010-12-08 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Madrid
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000395

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF SP NATO
SUBJECT: SPAIN ON AFGHANISTAN, ISAF STAGE II CONTRIBUTION

REF: A) SECSTATE 2743 B) MADRID SP 0307

Classified By: Classified by Political Officer Ricardo Zuniga; reasons
1.4 (B) and (D)

1. (C) Summary. Coordinator for Afghanistan Maureen Quinn,
accompanied by Department of Defense, JCS, and State
Department officers met with Spanish MOD, MFA and Presidency
officials on 1/26 to discuss Spain's commitment to lead a PRT
in western Afghanistan. Just before Ambassador Quinn's
arrival, the GOS released a brief statement indicating that
it was "studying" the possibility of both a Spanish
deployment to western Afghanistan and taking over the FSB in
Herat. The MOD meeting will be reported via septel. GOS
officials told the USG team that the press release was
intended to convey Spain's determination to lead a PRT,
though operational and political details remain to be worked
out. MFA Director General for Foreign Policy Rafael
Dezcallar described the PRT decision as one of several recent
GOS gestures aimed at repairing bilateral relations with the
USG. Dezcallar said that Foreign Minister Moratinos may
travel to Afghanistan soon and that Spain may establish a
permanent diplomatic mission in Kabul.

2. (C) At the Presidential Palace, Deputy National Security
Advisor Maria Alonso stressed the Zapatero Government's need
to build public support for the deployment, given the general
Spanish skepticism towards overseas military missions of any
type. She reviewed the steps necessary for the GOS to obtain
Parliamentary approval of the PRT mission and said she was
confident that the deployment would be approved with minimal
debate. She said Spain would also like to further discuss
the USG offer to consider providing civilian experts to aid
the PRT, per REF A points. End Summary.

//MFA: SPAIN COMMITTED TO AFGHANISTAN//

3. (C) MOD DG for Policy Admiral Torrente confirmed to
Ambassador Quinn that Spain plans to lead a PRT in western
Afghanistan, specifically at Qal'eh-ye Now, and to contribute
troops to the FSB at Herat. Full details of the MOD meeting
will be provided septel.

4. (C) At the MFA, DG Dezcallar pointed to the success of
ISAF and OEF operations in Afghanistan as a "demonstration
that multilateralism can be effective" and said NATO could be
proud of its work in "helping the Afghans help themselves."
Ambassador Quinn agreed that much had been accomplished,
especially through new models such as PRTs. She welcomed the
news of Spain's decision to lead a PRT in western Afghanistan
and to participate in the Herat FSB.

5. (C) Dezcallar said the PRT decision was "intentionally
leaked" by the GOS in order to convey Spain's commitment to
the long-term reconstruction of Afghanistan. He said this
was driven by strategic considerations, since Spain's
investigation of the March 11 train bombings in Madrid
suggested that the order to carry out the bombing had come
from individuals based in Afghanistan.

//NEXT STEPS ON SPANISH PRT//

6. (C) While Dezcallar emphasized that the GOS has made the
political decision to participate in a PRT, he also noted
that several steps remain. First, Spain will send a team of
MOD and MFA experts to Afghanistan to scout the precise
locations where Spanish forces will be deployed: Herat and
Qal'eh)ye Now (NOTE: The scouting team departed for
Afghanistan on 1/28. END NOTE). Second, the GOS will analyze
the report of the team and deliver a recommendation to
President Zapatero as to how Spain's deployment should
proceed. Lastly, President Zapatero will "consult" with
Parliament to gain legislative support for the mission.

//MENDING FENCES WITH USG//

7. (C) Dezcallar made clear that an important factor in
Spain's decision to proceed with a PRT was their sense that
it would help bring an end to bilateral tensions between
Madrid and Washington. Dezcallar said he knew the USG
appreciated actions more than words, so Spain had moved ahead
on Afghanistan and other issues, including Spain's
contribution of $20 million to the UNDP to support the Iraq
elections, GOS diplomatic efforts to encourage good behavior
on the part of Iraq's neighbors, and the decision of
President Zapatero not to stop in Venezuela during his visit
to Latin America. Dezcallar said he hoped these positive
steps would be recognized by the USG and would encourage
reciprocal gestures from Washington. He said "normalization"
of ties with Spain would help both sides work together to
advance the USG's "ambitious reform process" in the Mideast
and suggested Spain's experience with the Barcelona Process
could prove useful for the U.S. Ambassador Quinn said the
USG appreciated the positive steps taken by the GOS and told
Dezcallar that she would carry his message to Washington.

//DEEPER SPANISH ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN//

8. (C) Dezcallar said that Foreign Minister Moratinos may
travel to Afghanistan in the next several months. In
addition, Spain hopes to establish a permanent diplomatic
mission soon in Kabul and would eventually like to open an
embassy. Ambassador Quinn encouraged this increased GOS
engagement, saying the Afghan people were counting on the
international community to help them realize their growing
hopes for stability and economic growth. Dezcallar noted
that the GOS has directed aid to Afghanistan through the
Asian Development Bank, but would be willing to study other
possible assistance projects, including on counter narcotics.


//OEF)ISAF MERGER//
9. (C) At Dezcallar's request, the USG team briefed him on
the security situation in Afghanistan and the state of play
among the various regional leaders and factions. Dezcallar
said he was encouraged by the USG's information regarding
improved security conditions and suggested that coordination
between ISAF and OEF operations will have to improve and
perhaps even be merged as ISAF moves westward. (NOTE: We
assume Dezcallar was suggesting the merger of the missions
under an overall NATO command, since it is highly unlikely
the GOS would place Spanish forces at the disposition of a
U.S. command through participation in OEF. END NOTE.)
Ambassador Quinn agreed that integration is the right move,
but said that we have no set timeline. She noted the already
high level of coordination between OEF and ISAF personnel.

//PRESIDENCY: A FEW BUMPS ON THE ROAD TO PRT//

10. (C) In her meeting with Deputy National Security Advisers
Maria Alonso and Diego de Ojeda, Ambassador Quinn expressed
the USG's appreciation of Spain's decision to lead a PRT and
to contribute forces to the FSB in Herat. Alonso, who covers
the North America account, said the GOS was pleased that the
MOD and MFA had presented a good plan for Spain's
participation and that the GOS now had to explain the mission
to a public skeptical of any Spanish military deployment
abroad. Alonso was confident that the GOS would have no
problem in gaining Parliamentary approval for the deployment
since the Popular Party, the largest opposition party,
supported the NATO mission in Afghanistan. However, Diego de
Ojeda pointed out that the PRT proposal would have to be
slipped in between major legislative action on controversial
internal issues, perhaps briefly delaying formal approval of
the PRT. Also the two small leftist parties that generally
work with the Socialists to give them a Parliamentary
majority will vote against Spain's leadership of a PRT,
creating a minor, but unwelcome rift within the center-left.

//USG SUPPORT//

11. (C) Alonso indicated that Spain wants to emphasize the
civil reconstruction aspect of its PRT, but lacks civilian
experts to support that element of the mission. Spain hopes
to establish strong links to NGOs already operating in
western Afghanistan. Alonso also alluded to the USG offer
per REF A to consider making U.S. civilian experts available
to buttress the Spanish deployment, saying Spain would
appreciate such assistance. Ambassador Quinn and Alonso
discussed the makeup of the existing PRTs and the USG team
urged Spain to study all of the models in developing its own
plans.
MANZANARES