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Viewing cable 09WARSAW1228, POLAND COULD ACCEPT “COMPLEMENTARY” CONTINGENCY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09WARSAW1228 2009-12-18 14:02 2010-12-06 21:09 SECRET Embassy Warsaw
VZCZCXRO0375
OO RUEHSL
DE RUEHWR #1228 3521436
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181436Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9265
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T WARSAW 001228 

SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR EUR/CE (GLANTZ) AND EUR/RPM 

EO 12958 DECL: 12/18/2019 
TAGS NATO, MCAP, MARR, PREL, PL 
SUBJECT: POLAND COULD ACCEPT “COMPLEMENTARY” CONTINGENCY 
PLANNING FOR POLAND AND BALTIC STATES

REF: STATE 127892
Classified By: DCM William Heidt for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) SUMMARY: Deputy DefMin Stanislaw Komorowski and MFA Security Policy Director Adam Kobieracki reacted similarly when DCM raised reftel points -- Poland strongly agrees with the necessity of contingency planning for the Baltic States but would like to avoid delays in the completion of the EAGLE GUARDIAN plan for Poland. However, both Komorowski and Kobieracki suggested that Poland might be able to accept a “creatively packaged” plan that included separate but complementary components (“chapters”) for Poland and the Baltic States. They agreed that discussions should not be made public. END SUMMARY.
2. (S) In a meeting with DCM on December 17, Komorowski expressed satisfaction with the level of cooperation with other NATO contingency planners on EAGLE GUARDIAN. Poles were active participants in the process and looked forward to its completion by the end of February or early March. Komorowski was skeptical that a regional approach to contingency planning was the best way ahead. Komorowski said Warsaw would prefer a unique plan for Poland, although he allowed that Warsaw could accept the notion of two complementary chapters for Poland and the Baltic States within EAGLE GUARDIAN. More important for Poland was the need to avoid any delay in completing the plan or to rehash already-agreed components, such as the threat assessment. He added that he “agreed entirely” that the issue should remain as secret as possible, and that it was in the “common interest” to avoid public discussion of NATO contingency planning.
3. (S) Kobieracki made similar points to DCM on December 15, and suggested the USG engage in detailed consultations with Polish officials in Brussels and with the General Staff in Warsaw. He said Poland had hoped that a revised EAGLE GUARDIAN plan could be used as a starting point for developing contingency plans for the Baltic States rather than become intertwined with them. He hinted that a creatively packaged regional plan that met Polish needs in terms of conditionality and automaticity might be acceptable, but cautioned that Warsaw would need assurances that NATO’s defense of Poland was an “issue in its own right” and not dependent on the security or defense of other NATO members. Kobieracki insisted that Poland would also need assurances that regional planning would not negatively impact on NATO’s response to prospective crises, particularly with respect to pre-planned deployments. He urged that completion of EAGLE GUARDIAN not be delayed to accommodate incorporation of the Baltic States into a regional contingency plan. Kobieracki agreed that contingency planning discussions should not be made public. FEINSTEIN