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Viewing cable 09NEWDELHI48, MENON TOUGH ON PAKISTAN, BULLISH ON BILATERAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NEWDELHI48 2009-01-09 13:01 2010-12-16 21:09 SECRET Embassy New Delhi
VZCZCXRO3222
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNE #0048/01 0091306
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 091306Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4998
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7308
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1107
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1429
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5806
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3025
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1447
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6035
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1713
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7473
Friday, 09 January 2009, 13:06
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 000048 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
EO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2019 
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PK, IN, TSPL, KNNP, ETTC, 
ENRG, TRGY 
SUBJECT: MENON TOUGH ON PAKISTAN, BULLISH ON BILATERAL 
RELATIONSHIP IN DISCUSSION WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 32  B. NEW DELHI 29
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)
1. (S) SUMMARY. Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon on January 8 discussed Pakistan and the bilateral relationship in the context of the U.S. political transition with visiting Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher and Ambassador Mulford. Boucher and Menon were in full agreement on the need to ensure that Pakistan eliminate Laskhar-e-Tayiba, but disagreed on some tactics. Boucher urged Menon to “tone down” the Indian rhetoric and avoid any military movements that could be misinterpreted. Menon defended India’s strategy of publicly pressuring Pakistan’s security services, saying they had not yet made the strategic decision to cut ties with Lashkar-e-Tayiba, and that the civilian government was powerless to force this change. Menon agreed with Boucher that important progress was being made on preventing a future attack, with good cooperation with the U.S., but cautioned that for the moment the issue of Pakistan had become defining. Menon stressed the importance of focusing the bilateral relationship with the next U.S. administration on issues with broader popular appeal. He said India was very keen on an early visit by the next Secretary of State, and requested an early, quiet conversation to reassure India about U.S. nonproliferation policy. The Indian government planned to sign its Safeguards Agreement and to begin negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on an Additional Protocol at the end of January, but would not make a decision about designating a nuclear reactor park site for U.S. firms prior to the January 11-16 visit of the U.S.-India Business Council (USIBC) delegation. Menon said he hoped for a deal on End Use Monitoring (EUM) “as quickly as possible.” END SUMMARY.
Menon Tough on Pakistan, Bullish on Bilateral Relationship
- - - 
2. (C) In a meeting January 8, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon discussed with visiting Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and Ambassador Mulford issues including the Mumbai terrorist attack investigations, developments in Pakistan, End Use Monitoring (EUM), next steps in civil nuclear cooperation, and the bilateral relationship in the context of the U.S. political transition.
Pakistan Has Taken “No Irrevocable Steps” Post-Mumbai
- - - 
3. (S/REL UK) Boucher recounted for Menon his impressions from his visit to Paksitan (ref A), that Zardari and Gailani were committed to ridding the county of terrorism and had made real strides with the terrorist groups operating in the tribal areas, but that they now understood they also had to tackle Punjabi-based groups like Lashkar-e-Tayiba, which was much more difficult. “We’re not giving them any breaks: they must eliminate Lashkar-e-Tayiba,” Boucher stressed, adding that it would require persistence. The U.S. hoped to encourage a continuous flow of information, but Pakistan still prefered the mechanism to be a high-level dialogue.
4. (S/REL UK) Menon replied that Pakistan was “nowhere near the threshold of proving sincerity” in its response to the Mumbai attacks and had so far taken no “irrevocable” steps toward eliminating Lashkar-e-Tayiba as a threat to India. His worry was that the problem was “more basic,” that the civilian government was incaable of taking action against Lashkar and the military had not yet made the strategic shift required to do so. He recounted that Jaish-e-Mohammad was
NEW DELHI 00000048 002 OF 004
behind the assassination attempt on former Pakistani President Musharraf in 2003, but even that did not move the Pakistani Army to crack down; the group remains operational and has grown more lethal. Furthermore, compared to the Musharraf era, the Pakistan Army was “not responsible right now,” according to Menon, who cited provocations such as cease-fire violations.
India Focused on Pakistani Military, Dismissive of Civilian Government
- - - 
5. (S/REL UK) Boucher observed that while India had begun targeting pressure against Pakistani security services, the U.S. had decided to work through the civilian government. Boucher cautioned that recent statements claiming links between Pakistani security services and the Mumbai attacks made cooperation more difficult, as did some Indian military movements that, though limited, were enough to be noticed. Boucher said Pakistan had a democratic government committed to eliminating terrorism, and that the U.S. would hold them to it. Menon pointed out that India deliberately had not taken action that would undercut the civilian government or impact the Pakistani people, such as cutting trade, travel, or diplomatic representation. But Menon warned, “You’re setting the civilians up for a fall. If you raise expectations of increased civilian power, the military will knock them down.” Furthermore, an Indian embrace of the civilian government would be “the kiss of death.” Menon concluded, “Honestly I do not think the civilian government can solve the problem; the military must choose to act.”
6. (S/REL UK) Boucher shared that the U.S. had not reached the conclusion that Pakistan’s security services were directly involved in the Mumbai attacks and asked Menon to “tone down” the public pressure. Provoking the Pakistan military made constructive cooperation less likely. Menon replied, “What we have seen so far leads us to the opposite conclusion.” (Asked about evidence, Menon added that India’s conclusion was “based on inference.”) The political moment was such that the Pakistani Security Services could make a fundamental shift away from support to terrorist groups if they so chose, but they had not done so. “Let’s not insult one another by telling a story that the Pakistan Army was not involved,” said Menon. The Pakistan Army paid wages to Lashkar-e-Tayiba and sustained the organization, and until these ties were severed, India would continue to regard the Pakistani security services as complicit in the Mumbai attacks. Menon concluded, “They’re either unwilling to take action, or incapable, or both; any way you look at it, they’re involved.”
Good Progress on Preventing Further Attacks
- - - 
7. (S/REL UK) Menon agreed that important progress was being made on prevention of further terrorist attacks, with good cooperation with the U.S. He remarked that there was no popular resistance to the idea of FBI involvement in the Mumbai investigations. He agreed with Boucher that India could work with the United States to make itself safer regardless of Pakistan, but he stressed that unless the Mumbai perpetrators were brought to justice it will happen again. Menon concluded, “We have a huge confluence of interests, and as long as that exists we will work together.”  Boucher assured Menon that India could rely on the U.S. to keep up the pressure on Pakistan; Menon replied, “And you can count on our pressure on you to help you do it.”
End Use Monitoring: India “Ready For a Deal”
NEW DELHI 00000048 003.2 OF 004
- - - 
8. (C) Asked whether India was “ready for a deal” on End Use Monitoring (EUM), Menon replied emphatically, “Yes.” He added that he thought a deal was close, but that it would require “sitting at a table and finding a solution that is neither yours nor ours. We can do it.” He added that EUM was important to India and that he hoped for a deal “as quickly as possible.”
Progress With Energy Agency, But Nervous About U.S. Nonpro Policy
- - - 
9. (C) Menon shared that the government was ready to sign its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement and expected to do so “by the end of the month.” Negotiations with the Agency on an Additional Protocol were likewise scheduled to begin at the end of January. Menon expected the next Parliament to take up the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). (Comment: Menon did not mention the possibility of bypassing Parliament raised by External Affairs Minister Mukherjee, reported ref B.) Menon said the government had “rescheduled” a decision about designating a nuclear reactor park site for U.S. firms and that it would not be made in time for the January 11-16 visit of the U.S.-India Business Council (USIBC) civil nuclear delegation.
10. (C) Menon confided that many people in India were “nervous” about nonproliferation policy under the new U.S. administration. He hoped for an early, quiet conversation with the new U.S. administration, saying, “The world has changed in the past eight years, and we need to be sure we share updated views.” Boucher and Ambassador Mulford stressed the bipartisan support for the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as evidence that both political parties were aware of the changed environment.
Bilateral Relationship: Seeking The Next Big Idea
- - - 
11. (C) Boucher and Menon discussed a variety of bilateral issues in the context of the U.S. political transition. Menon agreed that the papers exchanged with Under Secretary Burns outlining bilateral issues ripe for progress were “very congruent, almost the same.” Menon stressed the importance of focusing on issues with popular appeal. Many good things were happening on health, education, and agriculture, according to Menon, but nothing that “captures the imagination.” Indians were beginning to view the relationship with the U.S. as only about political-military and nuclear issues.
12. (C) Boucher challenged Menon to think about formulating “the next big idea” to frame the bilateral relationship for the next several years. Boucher suggested that one direction might be toward popular issues, such as agriculture and energy, while another might be toward global issues, such as the environment and trade. Ambassador Mulford suggested that India might leverage its position amid the global financial crisis by elevating its stature in the international financial architecture. Menon agreed, but cautioned that for the moment the issue of Pakistan had become defining. Menon said he was very keen on an early visit by the next Secretary of State, but had not been sure who to ask.
13. (SBU) Assistant Secretary Boucher cleared this message.
NEW DELHI 00000048 004 OF 004
MULFORD